

Shared Territory, Regime Alignment, and Forced Displacement

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Abstract

An ethnic group is more likely to be forcibly displaced by the government when it shares territory with regime supporters. That pattern reflects the ideational significance of shared territory and a simple logic of appropriation—governments purge people with resources the regime’s constituents can easily access. We investigate forced migration using panel data on international refugee flows and limited cross-sectional data on ethnically-targeted displacement. We find that during periods in which an ethnic group’s neighbors are aligned with the regime, refugee flows from that group increase by up to 40%.

The UN High Commissioner on Refugees (Birkeland, Jennings, and Rushing 2012) estimates that in 2011 there were over 25 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) and another 15 million international refugees. These nonvoluntary migrations reflect varied causes: wars, natural disasters, human rights abuse. One particularly notable source of IDPs and refugees is government campaigns of forced population removal directed against specific ethnic groups.

Qualitative and micro accounts of forced displacement give a central role to shared territory, and the (real or imagined) physical, economic, and symbolic threats it implies. Yet, the large-n literature on forced migration overlooks this factor. The established correlates of forced migration are violence, regime type, and characteristics of the international system. Scholars find a robust relationship between internal violent threats and government violence against civilians, including displacement.¹ The interaction of domestic threats and low state capacity may make such attacks more likely.² Less democratic or more discriminatory regimes are linked to more forced migration (Anderton 2014; Iqbal 2007; Wayman and Tago 2010). The Cold War has been described as a permissive condition for abuse of civilians (Anderton 2014), while the effects of third-party interventions and international laws and norms are debated (Harff 2003; Kathman and Wood 2011; Schneider, Bussmann, and Ruhe 2012; Walling 2000).

We investigate the role of shared territory and regime alignments in government campaigns of forced displacement. We conceptualize forced displacement of particular ethnic groups as a tool for an incumbent regime to curry support. These campaigns increase the political salience of ethnic divisions, binding the regime's constituents closer. More tangibly, regime-aligned ethnic groups can seize abandoned assets. Based on that logic, we predict ethnic groups are most likely to be targeted for displacement when they share territory with regime supporters.

¹Davenport, Moore, and Poe 2003; Harff 2003; Melander and Öberg 2007; Mirkovic 1996; Moore and Shellman 2004; Rubin and Moore 2007; Schneider, Bussmann, and Ruhe 2012; Uzonyi 2015; Valentino, Huth, and Balch-Lindsay 2004; Wayman and Tago 2010.

²Anderton 2014; Esteban, Morelli, and Rohner 2015; Kalyvas 2006; Mason and Krane 1989; Querido 2009; Simons 1999. Low state capacity has been equated to low GDP per capita (Anderton 2014); the newness of the state (Jackson Preece 1998; Kelman 1997; Simons 1999); and natural resource dependence (Esteban, Morelli, and Rohner 2015; Querido 2009).

We examine panel data on refugee flows, as well as a small cross-sectional dataset of government campaigns of ethnically-targeted forced displacement. In the panel data, an ethnic group generated substantially higher refugee outflows in periods it shared territory with regime supporters. We find this result even though we compare only within groups and hold constant the amount of territory various groups share and the identity of their neighbors. The cross-sectional analysis of ethnically-targeted displacement also suggests a positive and large correlation between sharing territory with a regime-aligned ethnic group and the probability of forced migration.

Throughout this paper, our object of study is ethnically-targeted campaigns of forced displacement. We conceptualize such events as “the removal by members of a self-identifying ethnic group of those they consider an ethnic out-group from a community they define as their own” (Mann 2005, 15). This is Mann’s definition of “ethnic cleansing.” We avoid that term here because, for other authors and in international law, ethnic cleansing is defined in part by the intent of perpetrators to destroy the targeted group “as such.” The coherence of perpetrators’ attitudes toward their victims is critical. That definition is unworkable in a large-n setting. It also seems to rule out the possibility that some displacement is cynically opportunistic, undertaken without any profound commitment to eradication of a group as such.

This paper proceeds as follows. The next two sections explain the role of shared territory and of regime alignments in incentivizing governments to purge particular ethnic groups. Then, we examine our panel data on international refugee flows. We finally review and analyze data from the Minorities at Risk project on forced migration.

Shared territory and incentives for displacement

The imperative to dominate, defend, and purify physical territory (space) is a perennial theme in displacement campaigns. In the West, displacement of ethnic out-groups “is fundamentally linked to the political ideal of the homogeneous nation-state and the ethnic nationalism that underscores

it” (Jackson Preece 1998, 820).³ In many more countries, ethnic ideologues invoke special claims to particular territory (Horowitz 1985) and portray other ethnic groups as usurpers and pollutants, an existential threat to the special relationship of people and land (Kaufman 2015; Kiernan 2003; Straus 2012).

The real or imagined threat from outsiders may be physical or economic insecurity. Posen 1993 describes a military security dilemma caused by territorial integration of ethnic groups, particularly those of similar size. Displacement “solves” the security dilemma by sorting people into more defensible units, alleviating the commitment problems the might otherwise arise (Fearon 1998; Weidmann 2011). Shared territory can also imply resource competition, particularly in agrarian societies. Justifications for displacement campaigns may claim that scarcity and hardship are the work of out-groups. A historical example is the German medieval myth of the *Korn Jude* (“grain Jew”), who profits from hoarding grain during famine. The neo-Malthusian perspective suggests that ethnoterritorial conflict is a response to severe scarcity (Homer-Dixon 1994; Warziniack 2013; Zimmerer 2014). For example, Bundervoet (2009) finds that the 1993 killings in Burundi were more severe in places with greater communal land pressure. Verpoorten (2012) reports that the death toll in the 1994 Rwandan genocide was higher where population density was greatest and land acquisition difficult. On the other hand, large-n evidence linking environmental stress to ethnic violence is mixed (Bernauer, Böhmelt, and Koubi 2012).

Displacement campaigns not only invoke the rhetoric of insecurity and resource competition, they present an opportunity for resource appropriation. Displacement and appropriation may be a single process, if the regime allows security forces or unofficial militias to seize property as they conduct purges. Or appropriation may follow in the wake of campaigns of displacement.

Micro data shows that government displacement campaigns specifically target people with hard-to-move assets, especially land, that can be appropriated after their owners have fled. Targets of violence in Burundi in 1993 and Rwanda in 1994 tended to have larger land and livestock

³See also Eatwell 2006; Kelman 1997; Lieberman 2006; Mann 2005; Naimark 2002; Simons 1999; Ther 2014.

holdings than others (Bundervoet 2009; Verpoorten 2012). Engel and Ibáñez (2007) report that in Colombia households with larger landholdings were more likely to be threatened with violence, increasing their probability of displacement.⁴ Olsson and Siba (2013) use data from Darfur, 2003–05, to show that villages targeted by pro-regime militias were ethnically aligned with rebel movements but also had better land quality and water access than untargeted villages. Deserted villages with especially good land and water access attracted squatters from ethnic groups affiliated with the Sudanese regime (Olsson 2010). Ethnic purges followed by resource appropriation have also been documented in urban India (Brass 2003).

Shared territory makes appropriation particularly convenient and appealing. Physical proximity matters because the assets left behind during a campaign of displacement are abandoned precisely because they are not easily moved or liquidated.

Rioting by the chauvinistic Shiv Sena party in Mumbai illustrates the both the abstract and the tangible significance of shared territory. The Sena champions Marathi Hindus but is flexible in terms of which out-groups draw its ire. It was founded on resentments against Gujarati-speakers but “every few years a new enemy is found among the city’s minorities: Tamil clerks, Hindi-speaking cabdrivers, Sikh businessmen, Malayali coconut vendors” (Appadurai 2000, 630). In 1992–93, the Sena led pogroms against Muslims by invoking “the specter of a zero-sum battle for residential space and street commerce” (Appadurai 2000, 649). Mumbai has far too little space and housing. Over 50% of the population lives in slums that occupy just 6% of the city’s land (Verma 2011, 751). Another 10% of the population is comprised of homeless pavement dwellers (Appadurai 2000, 646). During the riots, Sena organizers traveled to slum neighborhoods and conducted ersatz household religious rituals (*mati arati*) to consecrate these spaces for Marathi Hindus. Rioters also took more literal steps to reclaim territory:

Muslims were cornered . . . in their own crowded spaces, hunted down with lists of

⁴They also point out that the effect of household wealth is twofold. Wealth increases the likelihood of threats but the opportunity costs of abandoning assets also increase as those assets accumulate.

names in the hands of organized mobs, and Muslim businesses and properties were relentlessly put to the torch (Appadurai 2000, 646).

Of course, most Shiv Sena followers did not materially benefit from the riots. But the Sena's campaign clearly aimed for the ritual and real appropriation of shared spaces.

A role for regime alignment

Shared territory often implies narratives of homeland, resource competition, and insecurity that can be activated by violence. And shared territory always represents opportunity for resource appropriation. Displacement is an especially attractive tool for the regime if its supporters share territory with groups unaligned with the regime.

A regime may initiate forced displacement to shore up support. This is a costly strategy and often motivated by crisis, although not necessarily by a threat from the group that will be targeted for displacement. Displacement can also be a bottom-up phenomenon. Regime supporters force out neighbors and appropriate local assets, wagering that the government will not interfere and may even assist.

Displacement of out-groups from territories shared with regime supporters can benefit the regime in two ways. First, violence, including displacement, increases the salience of ethnic politics, binding the regime's ethnic clients to it (Bulutgil 2015; Gagnon 1994; Wilkinson 2004). The symbolic politics of shared territory were outlined above. Government displacement campaigns activate those narratives and cast the regime as the savior of an embattled territory and people. Second, some regime supporters can appropriate resources left behind by the displaced.

Campaigns of forced migration may or may not target a group that poses any real threat to the regime or its supporters. They may not target the groups that have higher-than-average assets.⁵ Nor is objective deprivation or scarcity necessarily the trigger for resource-seizure-through-

⁵Conditional on ethnicity, however, greater household assets—especially fixed assets—should increase the risk of

displacement. A regime can win support by expropriating and transferring resources even if its supporters' own economic or environmental conditions are not especially dire. For example, Verpoorten (2012) points out that multiple studies of the Rwandan genocide have shown that the most likely perpetrators were neither the poorest people nor the ones with the least land.

Expectations

Which ethnic groups are targeted by government displacement? We expect territory shared with regime constituents to be a key indicator:

1. The probability of an ethnic group being forcibly displaced is higher when the group shares territory with the ethnic group most important to the survival of the incumbent national government, i.e., the group most closely aligned with the national executive.
2. The probability of an ethnic group being forcibly displaced is higher when the group shares territory with any ethnic group that is more important to the survival of the incumbent national government, i.e., a group that is relatively more closely aligned with the national executive.

These contentions do not necessarily mean shared territory and regime alignment *cause* displacement in the manipulationist sense. If ethnic groups' territories and regime affinities were assigned exogenously and randomly, we would expect that government displacement would be most likely in places where regime supporters and out-groups were sharing territory. But we do not test that contention here. Nor do we think it is a particularly useful or important contention.

Shared territory, regime alignment, and forced migration are fundamentally an endogenous system. Ethnic elites can and do make political alignments expecting that they will be able to appropriate land and property. For example, in 1996, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda invaded Zaire

individuals being targeted for displacement.

in hopes of replacing the country's president, Mobutu Sese Seko, with the rebel leader Laurent-Désiré Kabila. Banyarwanda militias in eastern Congo allied with Kabila. Banyarwanda had been stripped of citizenship and property rights in prior years. Militia commanders correctly calculated that they might take local political control and regain access to land by partnering with the invaders. Throughout Zaire, regional political leaders backed Kabila or Mobutu with the hope that they would be able to use the war to take local power and seize land and livestock. In the Nyunzu Territory, the main ethnic groups are Bantu and Pygmy, with the latter traditionally on the bottom of the hierarchy. Pygmies, as well as out-of-power Bantu notables, allied with Mobutu's government, seeing "an opportunity to obtain arms and supplies to sieze power locally and take revenge on their former oppressors" (Autessere 2010, 147). When fighting lapsed "ordinary citizens" were able to return to their villages while notables and traditional chiefs were driven back to the displacement camps by militias (Autessere 2010, 152). The Pygmy example illustrates a more general phenomenon, which is a territory-for-counterinsurgency bargain between a regime and an ethnic militia. The Sudanese government's partnership with Arab tribes in Darfur is a similar example. When Armenians were killed and expelled en masse from Turkey in 1915, Kurdish fighters conducted many of these purges and Kurds resettled abandoned Armenian areas.

In sum, political alignments between central regimes and groups that share territory are not exogenous to subsequent violent displacement. Some regimes come to power on the back of promises to carry out displacement. The implication of all of this is that we cannot isolate a "treatment effect" of shared territory or regime alignment on migration. Instead, we demonstrate the conjuncture of territory, alignment, and displacement as descriptive and explanatory observations.

Refugee flows

For our primary investigation, we utilize information on worldwide refugee flows between 1975 and 2009. The Ethnicity of Refugees data produced by Rüegger and Bohnet (2015) defines a

“refugee as a person who had to leave his country of origin because of conflict or persecution,” based on UNHCR standards. The authors obtained data on refugee stocks and refugees’ countries of origin produced by UNHCR and UNRWA.⁶ For refugee populations of two thousand or more people, the authors coded the ethnic breakdown of the refugee population based on qualitative sources. Theoretically, these refugees are all involuntary migrants pushed out by political circumstances and not, for example, natural disasters or economic downturn. Refugees may be fleeing non-government persecution but most are pushed out by government actions.

Refugees will usually begin their journey as IDPs and become refugees only after crossing an international border. Geography and the characteristics of neighboring countries influence whether IDPs continue their migration across international lines (Moore and Shellman 2006). Those considerations are captured by group fixed effects in the regression set-up below.

For each ethnic group, we calculate the number of new refugees recorded in a year by measuring any increase in the annual stock of refugees from one year to the next.⁷ We also calculate the lagged stock of refugees. Like Melander and Öberg 2006 we find a negative correlation between prior migration (the stock of refugees) and current migration. During a crisis, the most mobile people move first. The population left behind includes a greater share of people who are unwilling or unable to flee.

A clear objection to this refugee data is that it does not necessarily indicate that a particular ethnic group was targeted for displacement. General conditions in the country might be such that many groups were forced to flee. To account for this in our regression analysis, we calculate new refugees from all other groups in the same country-year. This measure accurately summarizes the traits of country-years that might explain refugee flows in general. These include political violence and regime type, but also national income, international trade, or neighborhood effects.

⁶UNRWA is the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, the only refugee population outside UNHCR’s purview.

⁷We have excluded net decreases in the stock of refugees because of uncertainty about whether this represents repatriation or permanent emigration. In the appendix, we estimate models of the flow of refugees, positive or negative. The implications of the models are consistent with the main text.

Sharing territory with the powerful

Our independent variables require information on both ethnic groups' territorial presence and their access to political power. Both pieces of information come from the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) Dataset v 2.0 (Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010; Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009).

Our independent variable of interest is territory shared between ethnic groups aligned with the current regime and out-of-power groups. Using EPR's GIS dataset, GeoEPR-ETH v 2.0 (Wucherpfennig et al. 2011), we identify shared territories, listing all the other ethnic groups with which each group overlaps spatially. Some groups do not have any shared territory. We base shared territory only on the initial entries in the GeoEPR-ETH dataset. For a given ethnic group, *neither the amount of overlapping territory nor the identity of overlapping groups changes over time* in our data. The significance of that fact is that, when combined with group fixed effects, we will be using *only* changes in political alignments among a fixed set of neighbors to code whether a group shares territory with regime constituents. We use this research design to control for group-level traits and to avoid capturing changes in settlement patterns in our key independent variables.

EPR rates ethnic groups' access to the national executive. In EPR's coding, an ethnic group is either included in central power or excluded. EPR then assigns included ethnic groups to a ranked tier of central power and excluded ethnic groups to non-ordinal sub-categories. The rankings allow us to identify the group with greatest access to the national executive, which we describe as being the most important to the regime's survival or the most closely-aligned with the regime. We can also rank other ethnic groups that are included in central power. The remaining groups in a country are those excluded from the central regime.

For ethnic groups, we first code a 0/1 variable for shared territory with the group most closely aligned with the regime (*Overlap group 1*). The leading ethnic group in the regime scores a zero on this variable. A second indicator captures shared territory with any more powerful group—i.e., a group that is (a) included in the central regime and (b) has a higher ranking in terms of access

to power. This variable is labeled *Overlap more powerful group*. We also code the area of overlap between an ethnic group and the most powerful group in the country (*Ln area of overlap with group 1*) and the total area of overlap with all ethnic groups favored by the regime (*Ln area of overlap more powerful group*).

Control variables and model specifications

We use three control variables in the model below, measured at the level of an ethnic group-year. Group population is self explanatory. A dummy variable indicates whether a group is included in central power. A second dummy variable records whether the ethnic group is fighting in any kind of civil war against the government, according to the EPR data.

We estimate OLS models of refugees below, incorporating group fixed effects in all models. Again, the fixed effects mean that our comparisons are within an ethnic group's own history, comparing periods when its neighbors were more and less powerful, while holding the identity of those neighbors constant.

We estimate panel-corrected standard errors for the models in the main text. In the appendix, we present models using feasible generalized least squares and estimates with country and year fixed effects along with three-level clustering of standard errors.

Results with refugee data

The Models in Table 1 all imply that ethnic groups generate more refugees in periods when their neighbors are aligned with the central government. In Model 1, overlap with the leading group in the country is associated with a 40% greater-than-average outflow of refugees. In Model 2, overlap with any more powerful group is correlated with 30% more refugees. Model 3 implies that a 1% increase in the territory shared with the most powerful group is associated with a 4% increase in refugee flows. A 1% increase in territory shared with any more powerful group corresponds to a

Table 1: Territorial overlap with regime supporters and refugees

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Overlap group 1	0.40** (0.11)			
Overlap more powerful group		0.28* (0.11)		
Ln area of overlap with group 1			0.04** (0.01)	
Ln area of overlap more powerful group				0.03* (0.01)
Included in central power	0.04 (0.08)	0.02 (0.08)	0.03 (0.08)	0.01 (0.08)
Ln population	0.04 (0.48)	0.00 (0.48)	0.06 (0.48)	0.02 (0.48)
Rebellion	0.81** (0.08)	0.80** (0.08)	0.81** (0.08)	0.80** (0.08)
Ln refugee stock	0.17** (0.01)	0.16** (0.01)	0.16** (0.01)	0.16** (0.01)
Ln new of other refugees from country	0.13** (0.00)	0.13** (0.00)	0.13** (0.00)	0.13** (0.00)
R ²	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.13
Adj. R ²	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.09
Num. obs.	20502	20502	20502	20502

All models include ethnic group fixed effects. ** = $p < 0.01$, * = $p < 0.05$.

3% increase in refugees (Model 4). All four coefficients are statistically different from zero at the 95% confidence level.

Minorities at Risk data on forced displacement and ethnic cleansing

The Minorities at Risk Project has published information on government ethnic cleansing and forced resettlement, although with very limited temporal coverage. The Minorities at Risk Dataset v 2.05 (Minorities at Risk Project 2009) records the following potentially relevant variables for government repression in the years 1996 to 2000: Systematic killings by paramilitaries (REP09), Property confiscated or destroyed (REP10), Forced resettlement (REP12), Interdiction of food supplies (REP13), and Ethnic cleansing (REP14).⁸ These categories are not mutually exclusive.

The MAR data are a useful check on our refugee results. MAR captures forced migration and also specifies that the government is behind this displacement and that an ethnic group was specifically targeted for displacement. We coded a 0/1 variable combining ethnic cleansing (REP14) and forced resettlement (REP12) into a single indicator. We also experimented with a broader measure that combined all five of the MAR variables listed above; the analysis was quite similar to what is reported below.⁹ Table 7 in our appendix lists the instances of ethnic cleansing and forced displacement in the MAR data matched to the EPR ethnic group list.

Given the very short time period covered by the MAR data (1996–2000), we collapse the panel structure to a cross-section. The dependent variable becomes ethnic cleansing at any time in the period 1996–2000. Independent variables are measured at the beginning of that interval.

Table 2 cross-tabulates the incidence of ethnic cleansing against the shared territory dummies. The left panel of the table compares the incidence of ethnic cleansing according to whether a group

⁸MAR further notes whether the government targeted repression at political activists and/or other civilians. We did not make use of this distinction.

⁹See Table 8 in the supplementary materials.

Table 2: Territorial overlap with regime supporters and the incidence of ethnic cleansing in the period 1996–2000

Target of ethnic cleansing	Overlap group 1			Overlap more powerful group		
	No	Yes	All	No	Yes	All
No	398 (98%)	212 (92%)	610 (96%)	366 (98%)	244 (92%)	610 (96%)
Yes	9 (2.2%)	18 (7.8%)	27 (4.2%)	7 (1.9%)	20 (7.6%)	27 (4.2%)
	$\chi^2 = 10^{**}$			$\chi^2 = 11^{**}$		

Table displays frequencies and column percentages. $** p < 0.01$

shared any territory with the regime’s primary supporters. Among groups that did not share territory with the regime’s most closely-aligned constituents, the rate of ethnic cleansing was about 2%. The rate was four times higher—7.8%—among groups that did share territory with the regime’s primary supporters. The right-hand panel shows a similar pattern when we compare groups in terms of whether they shared territory with any neighbor more important to the regime.

Table 3 presents four logistic regression models in which the dependent variable is our MAR-based dummy for forced migration in the 1996–2000 period. Our control variables include the group-level measures described above. At the country-level, we capture regime type using dummy variables for country-level *Democracy* and *Anocracy* based on the Polity IV dataset (Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2013). Country-level population (*Ln country population*), *Ln GDP per capita*, and *Trade as a share of GDP* are from Heston, Summers, and Aten (2011).

In Model 5 (Table 3), the dummy variable for territorial overlap with the regime’s primary supporters predicts a statistically significant increase in the probability of forced displacement. The coefficient of 1.8 corresponds to six times higher odds of being targeted for a purge. The overall probability of forced displacement in the data is 4.2%. If the corresponding odds are multiplied by 6, the new predicted probability is 21%. The implied increase in the chances of displacement is

Table 3: Logistic regressions of ethnic cleansing worldwide, 1996–2000

	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Overlap most powerful	1.78** (0.65)			
Overlap more powerful group		1.92** (0.72)		
Ln area of overlap most powerful group			0.17* (0.07)	
Ln area of overlap more powerful group				0.17* (0.07)
Ethnic group in power	−2.10 (1.13)	−2.16 (1.12)	−2.22* (1.12)	−2.31* (1.11)
Ln population	−2.03 (2.39)	−1.63 (2.43)	−1.47 (2.33)	−1.47 (2.52)
Incidence	2.17** (0.63)	2.16** (0.63)	2.14** (0.62)	2.12** (0.62)
Anocracy	−1.71* (0.70)	−1.80* (0.70)	−1.71* (0.73)	−1.77* (0.72)
Democracy	−1.32* (0.64)	−1.60* (0.65)	−1.41* (0.64)	−1.65* (0.65)
Ln country population	−0.34** (0.12)	−0.37** (0.11)	−0.37** (0.11)	−0.39** (0.11)
GDP per capita	−0.42 (0.32)	−0.37 (0.34)	−0.46 (0.32)	−0.43 (0.34)
Trade as share of GDP	−0.68 (1.60)	−0.71 (1.64)	−0.41 (1.48)	−0.48 (1.55)
Intercept	8.04 (4.21)	7.66 (4.29)	8.41 (4.30)	8.50 (4.64)
Log Likelihood	−67.72	−67.01	−69.03	−68.65
Num. obs.	586	586	586	586

** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

slightly larger in Model 6.

Models 7 and 8 report positive and statistically significant relationships between the size of the territory shared with regime supporters and the odds of forced migration.

Discussion

This paper is an initial investigation of forced migration, shared territory and regime alignment. Governments allow or initiate displacement in order to maintain support among the ethnic groups that are key to regime survival. For both symbolic and practical reasons, the best means to win that support is often to target out-of-power ethnic groups that share territory with regime constituents.

We use information on the ethnicity of refugees to obtain panel data on forced displacement. An ethnic group generated substantially higher refugee outflows in periods during which it shared territory with regime supporters. We find this result even though we compare only within groups and hold constant the amount of shared territory and the identity of neighboring groups. Data collected by the MAR Project on government-led displacement also suggests a positive and large correlation between sharing territory with a regime-aligned ethnic group and the probability of forced migration.

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Shared Territory, Regime Alignment, and Forced Displacement

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Supplementary Materials

Table 4: Reestimation of Table 1 using feasible generalized least squares

	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12
Overlap group 1	0.40** (0.05)			
Overlap more powerful group		0.55** (0.05)		
Ln area of overlap with group 1			0.02** (0.00)	
Ln area of overlap more powerful group				0.06** (0.01)
Included in central power	-0.18** (0.04)	-0.19** (0.04)	-0.23** (0.04)	-0.18** (0.04)
Ln population	2.29** (0.15)	1.91** (0.17)	2.91** (0.11)	1.75** (0.18)
Rebellion	0.17** (0.04)	0.21** (0.04)	0.24** (0.04)	0.22** (0.04)
Ln refugee stock	0.19** (0.00)	0.19** (0.00)	0.19** (0.00)	0.19** (0.00)
Ln new of other refugees from country	0.12** (0.00)	0.11** (0.00)	0.11** (0.00)	0.11** (0.00)
R ²	0.40	0.40	0.39	0.40
Adj. R ²	0.40	0.40	0.39	0.40
Num. obs.	20502	20502	20502	20502

All models include ethnic group fixed effects. ** = $p < 0.01$, * = $p < 0.05$.

Table 5: Reestimation of Table 1 incorporating country, year, and group fixed effects and clustering standard errors on all three groupings

	Model 13	Model 14	Model 15	Model 16
Overlap group 1	0.40** (0.18)			
Overlap more powerful group		0.29* (0.16)		
Ln area of overlap with group 1			0.04* (0.02)	
Ln area of overlap more powerful group				0.03* (0.02)
Included in central power	0.05 (0.15)	0.04 (0.15)	0.05 (0.15)	0.03 (0.15)
Ln population	0.15 (0.62)	0.11 (0.61)	0.16 (0.62)	0.12 (0.61)
Rebellion	0.81*** (0.26)	0.80*** (0.26)	0.81*** (0.26)	0.80*** (0.26)
Ln refugee stock	0.17*** (0.03)	0.17*** (0.03)	0.17*** (0.03)	0.17*** (0.03)
Ln new refugees from country	0.13*** (0.03)	0.13*** (0.03)	0.13*** (0.03)	0.13*** (0.03)
Num. obs.	20502	20502	20502	20502
R ² (full model)	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.40
R ² (proj model)	0.13	0.12	0.13	0.12
Adj. R ² (full model)	0.38	0.38	0.38	0.38
Adj. R ² (proj model)	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.09

All models include country, year, and ethnic group fixed effects. ** = $p < 0.05$, * = $p < 0.1$.

Table 6: Reestimation of Table 1 including negative refugee flows

	Model 17	Model 18	Model 19	Model 20
Overlap group 1	0.65** (0.20)			
Overlap more powerful group		0.49* (0.20)		
Ln area of overlap with group 1			0.07** (0.02)	
Ln area of overlap more powerful group				0.05* (0.02)
Included in central power	0.07 (0.14)	0.05 (0.14)	0.07 (0.14)	0.04 (0.14)
Ln population	-0.06 (0.83)	-0.14 (0.83)	-0.05 (0.83)	-0.11 (0.83)
Rebellion	1.22** (0.14)	1.22** (0.15)	1.22** (0.14)	1.21** (0.15)
Ln refugee stock	-0.26** (0.01)	-0.26** (0.01)	-0.26** (0.01)	-0.26** (0.01)
Ln new refugees from country	0.12** (0.00)	0.12** (0.00)	0.12** (0.00)	0.12** (0.00)
R ²	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.11
Adj. R ²	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.07
Num. obs.	20502	20502	20502	20502

All models include ethnic group fixed effects. ** = $p < 0.01$, * = $p < 0.05$.

Table 7: EPR ethnic groups targeted for “ethnic cleansing” and “forced resettlement,” 1996–2000, based on the Minorities at Risk dataset

Country	Targeted Group	Years “Ethnic Cleansing”	Years “Forced Resettlement”
Afghanistan	Hazaras	1998–2000	1999–2000
	Tajiks		1999–2000
	Uzbeks		1999–2000
Angola	Ovimbundu-Ovambo		1999
Azerbaijan	Armenians		1996–98
Botswana	San		1997–2000
Burundi	Hutu		1997, 1999–2000
China	Dongxiang		1996–2000
Colombia	Indigenous peoples		1996, 1999–2000
Congo, Republic of	Lari/Bakongo	1997–98	
Greece	Roma		1999–2000
Iraq	Kurds		1996–2000
	Shia Arabs		1999–2000
Laos	Hmong		1996–2000
Myanmar	Kayin/Karens		1996–2000
	Mons		1996–2000
	Muslim Arakanese		1996–2000
	Shans	1996–2000	1996–2000
	Zomis/Chins		1999–2000
Russia	Chechens	1999–2000	1999–2000
Rwanda	Hutu		1997
	Tutsi		1997
Sudan	Nuba	1996–2000	1996–2000
Syria	Kurds		1996–2000
Turkey	Kurds		1996–98
Uzbekistan	Tajiks		2000
Yugoslavia	Albanians	1999	1998–99
	Hungarians		1999

Table 8: Reestimation of Table 3 using a dependent variable that combines the following measures from MAR: Systematic killings by paramilitaries (REP09), Property confiscated or destroyed (REP10), Forced resettlement (REP12), Interdiction of food supplies (REP13), and Ethnic cleansing (REP14).

	Model 21	Model 22	Model 23	Model 24
Overlap most powerful	0.83** (0.27)			
Overlap more powerful group		0.81** (0.26)		
Ln area of overlap most powerful group			0.10** (0.03)	
Ln area of overlap more powerful group				0.10** (0.03)
Ethnic group in power	-0.94** (0.32)	-0.97** (0.31)	-0.93** (0.32)	-1.01** (0.32)
Ln population	-1.68 (1.13)	-1.54 (1.13)	-1.66 (1.13)	-1.63 (1.13)
Incidence	2.22** (0.44)	2.15** (0.44)	2.24** (0.45)	2.18** (0.45)
Anocracy	-0.25 (0.35)	-0.29 (0.35)	-0.24 (0.36)	-0.28 (0.35)
Democracy	0.41 (0.37)	0.28 (0.37)	0.40 (0.37)	0.22 (0.37)
Ln country population	0.01 (0.07)	-0.00 (0.07)	-0.00 (0.08)	-0.03 (0.08)
GDP per capita	-0.20 (0.14)	-0.16 (0.14)	-0.23 (0.14)	-0.18 (0.14)
Trade as share of GDP	-0.19 (0.66)	-0.21 (0.67)	-0.12 (0.67)	-0.18 (0.68)
Intercept	1.21 (1.64)	1.09 (1.64)	1.69 (1.68)	1.78 (1.68)
Log Likelihood	-241.04	-241.16	-239.43	-239.14
Num. obs.	585	585	585	585

** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$